Chullin Daf 39 צולין דַף 39

Amoraim discuss: if one shechts an animal with intent לזרוק דמה לעבודת כוכבים – to throw its blood for idolatry, ולהקטיר חלבה לעבודת כוכבים – or to burn its fats for idolatry, Rebbe Yochanan says the animal is forbidden in benefit as an idolatrous sacrifice, because מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה – one is able to have intent from one avodah to another avodah for idolatry, by deriving חוץ מבפנים – “outside” sacrifices (i.e., idolatry) from “inside” sacrifices (i.e., korbanos inside the Mikdash), where a korban shechted with the intent to perform זריקה the next day immediately becomes פיגול. Reish Lakish said the animal is permitted, because he holds אין מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה, and does not derive חוץ from פנים.

They argue similarly where one shechted a korban [chatas] לשמה – for its own sake with intent to perform zerikah שלא לשמה – not for its own sake. Rebbe Yochanan says the korban is פסול, because מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה – one is able to have intent from one avodah to another avodah, which we derive from פיגול. Reish Lakish says the korban remains valid, because his intent during one avodah about another does not impact the korban, and we do not derive otherwise from פיגול.

A Baraisa teaches regarding one who shechted an animal, ואח"כ חישב עליה – and afterwards declared he intended to perform זריקה of its blood or burn its fats for idolatry, such an incident occurred in קיסרי, ולא אמרו בה לא איסור ולא היתר – and they did not rule on [the animal], neither a permit nor a prohibition. The question is whether his later idolatrous intent indicates that the original shechitah was also for idolatry.

Rav Chisda suggests that they did not expressly prohibit it משום כבודן דרבנן – out of respect for the Rabbonon of our Mishnah, who hold we do not assume an idolator’s intent is always for idolatry, and they did not expressly permit it out of respect for Rebbe Eliezer, who holds we do assume an idolator’s intent is for idolatry. However, the Gemara rejects the comparison: the Rabbonon only permitted a case where we never heard idolatrous intent from the idolator, but here, where the Yisroel declared idolatrous intent, הוכיח סופו על תחלתו – his ultimate [intent] indicates his original [intent]. On the other hand, Rebbe Eliezer only prohibited the case of a gentile idolator, but regarding a Yisroel, perhaps we do not say his later intent proves his original intent was for idolatry.

Ravina ultimately explains that they did not expressly permit the above case out of respect for Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds הוכיח סופו על תחילתו: if one writes all his assets (including slaves) to someone, and the recipient said: אי אפשי בהן – “I do not want them,” the Tanna Kamma says that if the recipient is a Kohen, the slaves may eat terumah (because the gift took effect). Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says his protest voids the gift, and the first owner’s heirs inherit the slaves. The Gemara clarifies: בצווח מעיקרא – if he protested from the beginning, all agree the gift is void. בשותק ולבסוף צווח – Where he was initially silent, and later protested, all agree the gift is valid (and he merely changed his mind). They argue שזיכה לו על ידי אחר – where he transferred it to him through another person (who acquired it on his behalf), and the recipient was initially silent and later protested. The Tanna Kamma holds his initial silence proves he wanted it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: הוכיח סופו על תחילתו – his eventual [protest] proves the intent of his initial [silence]. He never wanted it, and was initially silent because he reasoned: כי לא אתי לידיה אמאי אצווח – as long as they did not come into my hands, why should I protest?