Horayos Daf 3 הוריו דַף 3

The Gemara asks, if Beis Din mistakenly ruled to permit one type of חלב, and a minority of the קהל acted on their ruling, then Beis Din retracted their ruling, then later again issued this ruling and another minority acted accordingly, do the two groups combine to form a majority (to obligate a פר העלם דבר)? Do we say כיון דשתי ידיעות נינהו לא מצטרף – since they occurred in two periods of awareness, they do not combine, or since they were both about the same type of חלב, they do combine? The Gemara asks, assuming these would combine, would two minorities who followed two rulings about different types of חלב combine, since they are both חלב, or not, since their prohibitions are derived from different words? If they do combine, would two minorities who sinned based on rulings about חלב and דם (respectively) combine? On the one hand, they are different איסורים, but on the other hand, their korban is the same (a כשבה or שעירה). If these also combine, would minorities for חלב and עבודה זרה also combine, since they are both כרת, or not, since their korbanos differ (because idolatry specifically obligates a שעירה)?

Rebbe Yonasan said that if one hundred judges gathered to issue a ruling, אין חייבין עד שיורו כולן – they are not liable to bring a פר העלם דבר for a mistaken ruling unless they all ruled, but not if one judge abstained, because the passuk says: ואם כל עדת ישראל ישגו – and if all the assembly of Yisroel shall err, teaching there is no korban עד שישגו כולן – until they all err. This is supported from the fact that throughout the Torah, רובו ככולו - the majority of [something] is considered like all of it, yet here the Torah specifically wrote “all” the assembly, implying that all the judges must rule. Rav Mesharshiya eventually disproves this from a Baraisa teaching that the Rabbis may not make a gezeirah אלא אם כן רוב הצבור יכולין לעמוד בה – unless most of the public can withstand it. This is derived from a passuk which says "הגוי כולו" – the entire nation, yet a majority of the nation suffices!? Rebbe Yonasan’s law is thus refuted, and the phrase "כל עדת ישראל" instead teaches: אי איכא כולם הויא הוראה – if all [the judges] are present, it is a legitimate ruling, but not if any judge is missing.

The next Mishnah states that if Beis Din issued a mistaken ruling and retracted, and an individual acted on their ruling (unaware of the retraction), Rebbe Shimon exempts him from a חטאת, regardless of whether they had already brought the פר העלם דבר or not. Rebbe Elazar says: ספק – it is doubtful if he is considered one who relied on Beis Din (since he was unaware of the retraction, but could have found out about it), and therefore brings an אשם תלוי (for the doubtful transgression). This is only if he was at home, but if he traveled overseas, he is exempt. Rebbe Akiva explained: שהיושב בביתו אפשר היה לו שישמע – the one sitting at home had the possibility of hearing about Beis Din’s retraction had he asked about it (and is therefore not definitively considered to have relied on Beis Din), but the one who traveled overseas could not have found out about their retraction. In a Baraisa, Rebbe Meir says he is חייב to bring a חטאת, and סומכוס says "תלוי" – his action is “dangling,” i.e., uncertain if there is a korban. Rebbe Yochanan explains that סמכוס argues with Rebbe Elazar and holds he is not חייב an אשם תלוי.